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Employing data on US immigrants and trade with 59 home countries for
the years 1996–2001, we compare the extent to which refugee and nonrefugee immigrants aﬀect US trade with their home countries and
provide the ﬁrst evidence of variation in the US immigrant–trade
relationship across immigrant types. We also consider the abilities of
refugee and non-refugee immigrants to oﬀset the trade-inhibiting
inﬂuence of cultural distance. Our results show that while immigrants,
in general, exert positive inﬂuences on US imports from – and exports
to – their home countries, the inﬂuence of refugee immigrants is quite
minimal when compared with that of non-refugee immigrants. For both
immigrant types, however, evidence supporting the notion that
immigrants act to oﬀset cultural distance is observed. To conceptualize
the economic meaning of our results, we provide estimates of the extent
to which each type of immigrants oﬀset transport costs.
Keywords: cultural distance; gravity; immigrants; networks; refugees;
trade

1.

Introduction

Starting with Gould (1994), who ﬁrst documents an immigrant–trade link
using US data, a voluminous literature has been published detailing the
inﬂuences of immigrants on trade for various host countries. More recent
studies (Mundra 2005; Tadesse and White 2010a; White 2007a, 2009)
conﬁrm the pro-trade inﬂuences of immigrants for the US and document
that the eﬀect of immigrants on US–home country trade is sensitive to
cultural, institutional and economic diﬀerences between the US and the
immigrants’ home countries. Yet, little attention has been paid to examining
whether the inﬂuence of immigrants on US–home country trade varies by
immigrants’ entry classiﬁcations. As the extent to which immigrants
inﬂuence trade is generally sensitive to their anthropogenic characteristics,
*Corresponding author. Email: roger.white@fandm.edu
ISSN 0963-8199 print/ISSN 1469-9559 online
Ó 2010 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/09638190903217537
http://www.informaworld.com

Downloaded By: [White, Roger] At: 13:27 11 June 2010

290

R. White and B. Tadesse

which may diﬀer by entry classiﬁcation, examining variation in the
immigrant-trade link across immigrant types may provide new insights
into the channels through which the link is assumed to operate. It also
fosters a better understanding of the roles that diﬀerent types of immigrants
play in inﬂuencing their host-home country commercial relationships and
may beneﬁt the formulation of appropriate social policy. In fact, the
ongoing debates over US immigration and trade policies also underscore the
importance of garnering a complete understanding of the topic. Our work
augments the literature by contrasting immigrant–trade links between two
broad, yet distinct, immigrant categories: immigrants admitted as refugees
and asylum-seekers (hereafter generalized as ‘refugees’) and immigrants
admitted under the guise of ﬁlling labor market vacancies, diversity
promotion, and family reuniﬁcation, etc (hereafter ‘non-refugees’).
Immigrants, generally, are thought to inﬂuence trade between their host
and home countries in a variety of ways that have been categorized into two
broad channels. First, they may increase host country imports from their
respective home countries if they arrive with strong preferences for home
country goods and ﬁnd neither the desired products nor reasonable
substitutes available. White (2007a) refers to this channel as ‘transplanted
home bias’. Second, immigrants may have knowledge of home country
markets that, if exploited, could increase trade ﬂows. Dunlevy (2006)
describes this channel as the ‘information bridge hypothesis’, while
Greenaway et al. (2007) presents this channel as involving both a ‘cultural
bridge’ and an ‘enforcement bridge’, each of which utilizes immigrants’
knowledge of home country customs and business practices, language
abilities, or understanding of complex informal contracting structures to
reduce the asymmetry of information arising from cultural and, hence,
institutional diﬀerences, thereby increasing trade ﬂows. Likewise, through
their connections to home country business or social networks, immigrants
may aﬀect trade if their connections facilitate transmission of information
regarding business opportunities or deter opportunistic behavior, perhaps
through a form of reputation-enforcement (Rauch and Watson 2002; Rauch
and Trindade 2002; and Rauch 1999, 2001). As noted, the analysis of
whether refugee and non-refugee immigrants’ use of these abilities equally
aﬀects host-home country trade may have important policy implications.
To meet our objective, we employ US immigrant and trade data with 59
home countries that span the years 1996–2001. Historically, the US has
accepted relatively diverse and large numbers of immigrants; however,
passage of the several pieces of legislation – most notably, the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1965 – transformed the basis for immigrant entry by
granting priority to immigrants based on family reuniﬁcation, ﬁlling
vacancies in the labor market, and permitting entrance of refugees and
asylum-seekers, thus changing the composition of subsequent immigrant
inﬂows.1 Refugees, as set forth in the Act, are immigrants who are unable or
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unwilling to return to their home countries due to persecution or a wellfounded fear that, upon return, they may face persecution due to their race,
religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership(s) in a particular
social group(s). Non-refugee immigrants, for our purpose, are those
admitted to the country to ﬁll labor market vacancies, for family
reuniﬁcation or as part of the diversity lottery. To provide an indication
of the relative magnitudes of refugee and non-refugee immigrant inﬂows,
approximately 3.6 million of the more than 28.5 million documented
immigrants who arrived in the US during the 1946–2001 period were
classiﬁed as refugees. This not inconsequential number of refugee arrivals is
equivalent to 12.6% of the observed inﬂow of immigrants during this period
(United States Department of Homeland Security 2004; United States
Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service 1960–2001;
United Sates Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 1951).
The potential diﬀerences in the abilities of refugee and non-refugee
immigrants to aﬀect US–home country trade can be attributed to two
general facets. First, most refugee immigrants arrive in the US after
spending a considerable number of years in a third country and, in the
process, may adapt their tastes and preferences to consumption of goods
and services available in the countries that embraced them during their
transition. Thus, the extent to which, through their transplanted home bias
eﬀects, refugee immigrants aﬀect US trade with their home countries may
diﬀer from those of non-refugee immigrants, who often arrive in the US
directly from their home countries. Second, the extent to which, through
their cultural bridge and network eﬀects, non-refugee immigrants aﬀect US
trade with their home countries may diﬀer from those of refugee immigrants
as the latter have tenuous ties to their home countries and may face
diﬃculties, due to fears that those in their networks may face persecution, in
using their network connections to conduct transactions. These reasons give
rise to our three working hypotheses: ﬁrst, that the eﬀect of non-refugee
immigrants on US imports is greater than that of refugee immigrants.
Second, given that refugees have limited abilities to maintain/foster
connections with their home country-based trading partners, we hypothesize
that they are also less inﬂuential in increasing US exports to their home
countries through their cultural and enforcement bridge eﬀects. While these
hypotheses provide reasonable grounds to expect diﬀerences in the extent to
which refugee and non-refugee immigrants might inﬂuence US trade with
their home countries, as mentioned earlier, to date no research has examined
such diﬀerences. Third, suggestive of greater roles that immigrants could
play than have been discussed in the literature, recent studies indicate that
immigrants partially oﬀset the eﬀects of cultural distance on their host
country’s trade with their home countries (Tadesse and White 2010a, 2010b;
White and Tadesse 2009). Based on the ﬁndings from these studies and the
observation that, compared with typical non-refugee immigrants, refugee
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immigrants are less connected to their home country, we also hypothesize
that the abilities of refugee and non-refugee immigrants to counter any
associated trade-inhibiting inﬂuences of cultural distance diﬀer from one
another; again, this is a further elaboration of the emphasis of most recent
studies that examine the immigrant–trade link.
Results from our study indicate that while immigrants exert positive
inﬂuences on US imports from and exports to their home countries, the
inﬂuence of refugees on US trade with their home countries is quite minimal
when compared with that of non-refugee immigrants. For both immigrant
types, our ﬁndings support the notion that immigrants act to oﬀset cultural
distance; with the related eﬀects of non-refugee immigrants being stronger
than those of refugees. To conceptualize our results, we estimate each
immigrant type’s ability to oﬀset transport costs (as represented by geodesic
distance). Our ﬁndings indicate the importance of accounting for immigrant
types when undertaking empirical analysis involving the immigrant–trade
link while implying the need for more detailed analysis of immigrant
characteristics.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the related
literature. Section 3 presents the empirical speciﬁcation, while Section 4
details both the data and the variable construction. Estimation results are
discussed in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.
2.

Review of the immigrant–trade link literature

As mentioned at the outset, evidence of a robust positive relationship
between immigrants and host–home country trade has been reported for
several home countries. Following Gould (1994), pro-trade immigrant
inﬂuences have been documented for Canada (Helliwell 1997; Head and
Ries 1998; Wagner et al. 2002), Greece (Piperakis et al. 2003), Malaysia
(Hong and Santhapparaj 2006), New Zealand (Bryant et al. 2004), and
Spain (Blanes 2003, 2006; Blanes and Martin-Montaner 2006). Examining
Canada–Taiwan trade, Ching and Chen (2000) also ﬁnd evidence of protrade immigrant eﬀects. Similarly, Greenaway et al. (2007) and Rauch and
Trindade (2002) employ Chinese population shares to represent the presence
of ethnic Chinese networks and report that such networks increase bilateral
trade ﬂows. Studies conducted using US state-level export data also report
pro-export immigrant eﬀects (Co et al. 2004; Bardhan and Guhathakurta
2005; Herander and Saavedra 2005; Dunlevy 2006; Tadesse and White 2007;
and Bandyopadhyay et al. 2008). Examining intra-France trade, Combes
et al. (2005) report a pro-trade inﬂuence of migrants. Finally, Blanes (2005)
for Spain and White (2008) for the US report that immigrants exert positive
inﬂuences on intra-industry trade.
Several other studies examine variation in the immigrant–trade link
across home countries and product classiﬁcations. White (2007a) reports
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that the US immigrant–trade link is driven by immigrants from relatively
low-income countries. Considering the inﬂuence of immigrants on US–home
country trade across product classiﬁcations, Rauch (1999) and Mundra
(2005) ﬁnd that immigrants exert stronger pro-trade eﬀects on diﬀerentiated
products. Allowing for variation in the eﬀects of immigrants on trade across
home country income classiﬁcations and Rauch (1999) product classiﬁcations, White (2009) concludes that the links are weakest for US exports of
homogeneous products to high-income countries and strongest for US
imports of diﬀerentiated products from low-income countries. Examining
Danish data, White (2007b), however, reports a diﬀerent result: immigrant–
trade links are greatest in magnitude for trade in diﬀerentiated products
with high-income immigrant countries, and weakest, yet positive, for trade
in homogeneous products with low-income immigrant countries. Further,
less variation was found, across product types and home country
income classiﬁcations, in the Danish immigrant–trade link relative to the
US case. White suggests the diﬀerences in ﬁndings may be attributable to
the relative homogeneity of the Danish population, relative to the US
population, which could foster an increased ability for immigrants from all
home country classiﬁcations to increase trade via preferences for unavailable
home country products or through their connections to home country
networks.
Using UK data and stratifying their sample of home countries by
‘commonwealth’ or ‘non-commonwealth’ aﬃliation, Girma and Yu (2002)
report pro-trade inﬂuences for immigrants in the latter classiﬁcation and
attribute the diﬀerences in immigrants’ eﬀects on trade to institutional
dissimilarities between the UK and non-commonwealth countries. Indirectly
testing Girma and Yu’s conclusion, White and Tadesse (2007) classify
Australian immigrants’ home countries by their access to preferential
treatment (in terms of immigrant entry, assisted migration, etc) under the
White Australia policy, and consider whether Australia’s abandonment of
the policy led to subsequent variation in immigrant–trade links. The authors
report that immigrants from nations not aﬀorded preference under the
policy exert stronger proportional inﬂuences on Australian imports, while
those from nations aﬀorded preference exert stronger inﬂuences on exports
and propose that the observed variation may stem from the home country’s
cultural dissimilarities with Australia. Despite these evidences, which imply
the inﬂuence of immigrants on home–host country trade is immigrantspeciﬁc (i.e. individual abilities and home country characteristics), neither of
these studies nor that of Herander and Saavedra (2005), which reports
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the eﬀects of immigrants who reside in a
given state and those who reside in other states on US state-level exports to
the immigrants’ home countries, consider entry classiﬁcation (which may
encompass both immigrant-speciﬁc and immigrant home country attributes)
as a potential source for the observed variation.
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The only study that has considered variation in immigrant–trade links
across entry classiﬁcations is that of Head and Ries (1998). Employing trade
and immigration data for Canada and 136 immigrant home countries for the
years 1980–1992 and using ﬁve diﬀerent immigrant entry classes: family
immigrants, refugees, independent immigrants, entrepreneurs and other
business classes (investors and the self-employed), the authors demonstrate
the existence of signiﬁcant heterogeneity across entry classes in terms of the
inﬂuences of immigrants on Canada–home country trade. Refugees are
reported to have no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on Canadian exports, although
they signiﬁcantly increase Canadian imports. To the contrary, independent
immigrants are found to exert the strongest inﬂuence on Canadian trade.
Since such immigrants are selected using a points-based system that
considers educational attainment, occupational demand and other factors,
Head and Ries identify independent immigrants as likely to be more skilled;
thus explaining the relative strength of the observed pro-trade inﬂuence.
Family immigrants are also found to exert positive inﬂuences on both
imports and exports. Business and entrepreneur classes of immigrants exert
lesser, yet positive, inﬂuences on exports and positive, yet relatively weak,
inﬂuences on imports. While our data precludes such detailed analysis, we
are able to distinguish between immigrants who entered the US as refugees
(for humanitarian reasons) and those who entered as non-refugees (for
economic reasons, to ﬁll labor market vacancies, as part of the diversity
lottery or for family creation/reuniﬁcation). Further, we employ a relatively
new measure of US–home country cultural distance to capture the related
inﬂuences of cultural (dis)similarity on trade ﬂows. This enables us to
consider variation in the immigrant–trade relationship across distinct
immigrant types while accounting for potential diﬀerences in their abilities
to oﬀset the trade-inhibiting eﬀects of cultural and institutional diﬀerences
and the eﬀects of transportation costs as represented by geodesic distance.
3.

Intuition and empirical speciﬁcation

Following the lead of prior studies, we employ a variation of the standard
gravity speciﬁcation.2 In its most simple derivation, the gravity speciﬁcation
models trade between two countries i and j during year t (T~ijt) as an
increasing function of the trading partners’ combined economic mass
(YitYjt) and a decreasing function of transportation costs, usually
represented by geodesic distance (GDij). According to the model, intuitively,
higher home country GDP (Yjt) implies greater potential export markets for
host country i to serve and an increased probability that the host country
imports from home country j. Likewise, higher host country GDP (Yit)
signals a greater capacity to both export and import. Geodesic distance
(GDij), a proxy for transport costs, is measured as the distance between the
capital cities of host country i and each home country j and is expected to
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reduce trade. To capture the potential inﬂuence of host–home country
cultural dissimilarity, and the role immigrants might play in countering the
inﬂuence, we follow Tadesse and White (2010a) and augment the theoretical
model with the ratio of the immigrant stock from country j residing in
country i to the cultural distance between the immigrants’ host and home
countries (IMijt/CDijt). This ratio is included in Xfijt ; a vector that contains
trade-facilitating/inhibiting factors that are often discussed in the literature.
Equation (1) illustrates.
!
b
b
Yit1 Yjt2
ð1Þ
Xfijt
T~ijt ¼ a
g1
GDij
Equation (1) postulates that while both geodesic distance between
immigrants’ host and home countries negatively aﬀect trade, the extent to
which cultural distance aﬀects trade may be inﬂuenced by the stock of
immigrants from home country j living in host country i. Adding an
identically and independently distributed and multiplicative error term, eijt,
makes the equation stochastic:
!
b
b
Yit1 Yjt2
ð2Þ
T~ijt ¼ a
Xfijt eijt
g
GDij1
Expanding the vector Xfijt , and allowing a to be the constant of
proportionality, taking natural logarithms of the continuous variables on
both sides of the Equation (2), and including terms that interact immigrant
stock and cultural distance variables to capture the potential variation in the
inﬂuences of immigrants across relatively more (or less) culturally-distant
home countries, results in our empirical speciﬁcation:
ln T~ijt ¼ a0 þ l1 ln IMijt þ l2 ln CDijt þ l3 ðln IMijt  ln CDijt Þ þ g1 ln GDij
þ f1 D ln Tijt1 þ f2 ln Yjt þ f3 ln POPjt þ f4 D ln XRATEijt


Ydefjt
þ f6 ln OPENjt þ f7 ln REMjt þ f8 ENGj
þ f5 ln
Ydefit
þ f9 FTAij þ f10 PORTj þ bO Ot þ eijt

ð3Þ

We begin our analysis by estimating Equation (3) without distinguishing
between refugee and non-refugee immigrants. We then distill the immigrant
stock variable into refugee immigrants (REF_IMijt) and non-refugee
immigrants (NREF_IMijt) and repeat the estimation. Finally, we decompose
our cultural distance variable into its component dimensions to facilitate
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more detailed analysis. A priori, we hypothesize that l1 4 0, l2 5 0 and
l3 4 0, and that once the immigrant stock variable is decomposed into
refugees and non-refugee immigrant cohorts, l1NREF IM > l1REF IM  0, while
the coeﬃcient on the cultural distance coeﬃcient is expected to remain
negative.
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4.

Data and variable construction

Our vector of dependent variables includes aggregate US imports, exports
and disaggregated (manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors) import
and export values, each of which is regressed, in turn, on the set of
explanatory variables. All trade data are from the SourceOECD Database.
As the US is country i, corresponding GDP values (included in equations (1)
and (2)) do not vary across trading partners and their eﬀects are subsumed
into coeﬃcients on the time dummy variables. While several of our control
variables are standard, two of the variables are of primary interest to us and
warrant speciﬁc discussion. Next we provide a brief discussion of these two
variables before turning to the remaining control variables.
4.1.

Refugees and non-refugee immigrant stocks

The US census provides country-level immigrant stock values for the years
1990 and 2000 (Gibson and Lennon 1999; US Census 2006). While
immigrant stock data are not available for the intra-census years, annual
immigrant inﬂow data for the years 1991–2001 are available from the US
Department of Homeland Security (2004). We generate immigrant stock
estimates for intra-census years by treating the census values as accurate and
employing the inﬂow data. Immigrant
P stocks for the years 1991–1999 are
^ ijt1 þ t INFijt þ dj , where IM
^ ijt1 is the
thus estimated as IMijt ¼ IM
1991
estimated immigrant stock from country j residing in the US during the year
immediately prior and dj is an adjustment factor accounting for return
migration and immigrant deaths that occur during intra-census years. The
adjustment factor is equal to the country j immigrant stock reported by the
2000 census less the sum of immigrants from that country in the US in 1990
and the inﬂow
from that country
years 1991–2000, divided by

Pduring the 
ten: dj ¼ IMij2000  IMij1990 þ 2000
t¼1991 INFijt =10. As the most recent
population census was taken in 2000, we cannot apply the same
interpolation technique to estimate immigrant stock values for the year
2001. We do, however, utilize the benchmark values provided by the 2000
census with the 2001 immigrant inﬂow data to estimate immigrant stock
values for the year 2001. Speciﬁcally, immigrant stock values for 2001 are
estimated as (IMij2001 ¼ (IMij2000 þ INFij2001)(1 þ dj/IMij2000). The corresponding proportional adjustment is based on the adjustment factor derived
when estimating 1991–1999 immigrant stocks. Speciﬁcally, the adjustment is
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made using the percentage diﬀerence between raw 2000 immigrant stock
values and 2000 census values.
To estimate refugee immigrant stocks, we utilize inﬂow data for refugees
(REF_INFijt) and for other immigrants (NREF_IMijt) during the years
1946–1990 (DHS 2004; INS 1960–1977, 1978–2001) to ﬁrst estimate the
1990 refugee stock:
1990
P

REF IMij1990 ¼ IMij1990 

REF INijt

t¼1946
1990
P



REF INFijt þ NREF INFijt
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t¼1946

The estimate of the non-refugee immigrant stock is given by NREF_
IMij1990 ¼ IMij19907REF_IMij1990. Estimated refugee and non-refugee immigrant stocks, for each non-census year during the 1991–2001 period, were
then constructed as REF_IMijt ¼ (REF_IMijt–1 þ REF_INFijt) 6 (1 þ dj/
IMij2000) and NREF_IMijt ¼ IMijt–REF_IMijt, where dj is as described
above. A combination of the 1991–1999 and 2001 immigrant stock estimates
with the 1990 and 2000 census values results in estimates of the refugee, nonrefugee immigrant and total immigrant stocks that span the years 1990–
2001. Due to our inability to compile complete series for some of the other
control variables for years early in the period, we restrict our study to the
years 1996–2001.
4.2.

US–home country cultural distances

Following Tadesse and White (2010a), we estimate US–home country
cultural distances using data from the World Values Surveys (WVS) and the
European Values Surveys (EVS) (Inglehart et al. 2004; Hagenaars et al.
2003). The surveys provide data from representative national samples
and pertain to a broad and varying set of topics that includes
economics, politics, religion, sexual behavior, gender roles, family values,
communal identities, civic engagement, ethical concerns, environmental
protection, and scientiﬁc and technological progress (Inglehart et al. 2004).
Given the broad coverage of the topics on which the measure of cultural
distance is based, as mentioned, the variable also potentially reﬂects
institutional (dis)similarities between the US and the immigrants’ home
countries. Factor analysis is applied to classify respondents along two
dimensions of culture: Traditional authority versus Secular-Rational
authority (TSR) and Survival values versus Self-Expression values (SSE)
(Inglehart et al. 2004).3 We construct average TSR and SSE values for each
home country and estimate the US–home country cultural distance as

Downloaded By: [White, Roger] At: 13:27 11 June 2010

298

R. White and B. Tadesse
qﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ

2 
2
CDijt ¼
TSRjt  TSRit þ SSEjt  SSEit .4 Figure 1 illustrates diﬀerences across TSR and SSE dimensions and cultural distances for several
home countries.5
The TSR dimension of culture (vertical axis) reﬂects the contrast
between societies in which deference to the authority of a God, a nation or
the family is viewed as important or as an expectation (i.e. Traditional
societies) and those societies in which the individual and self-expression are
stressed (i.e. Secular-rational societies). Higher TSR values correspond to
greater emphasis on obedience to religious authority, national pride,
adherence to family/communal obligations, and norms of sharing. Members
of such societies tend to view large families and large numbers of children as
positive, or desirable, while divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and suicide are
viewed in a very negative light. Members of Secular-rational societies tend to
hold opposing views on these topics, adhere to rational-legal norms, and
emphasize economic accumulation and individual achievement.
The SSE dimension of culture (horizontal axis) reﬂects diﬀerences
between societies that emphasize hard work and self-denial (Survival values)
and those that place greater emphasis on quality of life issues, such as
women’s emancipation and equal status for racial and sexual minorities
(Self-expression values). Societies in which individuals focus more on
survival tend to emphasize economic and physical security more than
autonomy. Generally, members of these societies ﬁnd foreigners/outsiders,
ethnic diversity and cultural change to be threatening. This corresponds with
an intolerance of homosexuals and minorities, adherence to traditional
gender roles, and an authoritarian political outlook. Members of societies in
which Self-Expression values are emphasized tend to hold opposing
preferences on these issues.

Figure 1.

Relative cultural distance from the United States, select countries listed.
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4.3. Additional control variables
The remaining explanatory variables in our empirical model include the
lagged ﬁrst-diﬀerence of the dependent variable, and several other variables
(the change in the US–home country exchange rate, the US and immigrants’
home country GDP deﬂators, measures of economic remoteness and of
openness to trade) often included in the modiﬁed gravity model.6 While
Gould (1994) and Eichengreen and Irwin (1996) use one-year lagged values
of the dependent variable as an explanatory variable, interpreting their
speciﬁcations as partial adjustment models, following Wooldridge (2002),
we test for autocorrelation in similar speciﬁcations and ﬁnd evidence of ﬁrstorder autocorrelation for each of our dependent variables. In the presence of
AR(1) in the data, inclusion of the lagged dependent variable would bias
estimated coeﬃcients downward and potentially obscure any meaningful
eﬀects of changes in explanatory variables, including those of immigrants,
on trade. Thus, to control for the inﬂuence of trade inertia, we include the
lagged ﬁrst-diﬀerence of the dependent variable (given as D ln Tijt71 ¼ ln
Tijt717ln Tijt72) and employ the method of Random Eﬀects Generalized
Least Squares. As changes in dependent variables are related to trends in
bilateral trade ﬂows, rather than size or distance, the inclusion of this
variable does not violate the theoretical gravity equation in Equation (1),
nor bias the coeﬃcient estimates downward.
We use annual changes in the US–home country exchange rate
(XRATEijt), given as home country currency units per US dollar, to
represent potential terms of trade eﬀects (IMF, 2007). An increase in the
variable signals a depreciation of the home country currency vis-à-vis the
dollar and, thus, an expected increase (decrease) in US imports (exports).
Also controlling for the inﬂuences of relative prices, we include the ratio of
home country-to-US GDP deﬂators (Ydefjt/Ydefit). While Gould (1994)
employs US and home country GDP deﬂators, separately, we follow the
methodology of Head and Ries (1998) as we believe this measure of relative
prices is better-suited, as compared to including the GDP deﬂators
separately, to capturing the expected positive inﬂuences of relatively higher
(lower) home country prices on US imports (exports).
Since immigrant home countries’ trade with the US may also depend on
the availability of non-US trading opportunities, we include a measure of
the economic remoteness of each home
constructed
following


P country,
Wagner et al. (2002) as REMjt ¼ 1= K
k¼1 ðYkt =Ywt Þ=GDjk where Ywt is
gross global product and k identiﬁes potential non-US trading partners for
country j.7 The pro-trade inﬂuences of immigrants arguably results from
recent trade liberalization or from greater trading infrastructure; for
example, access to airports, seaports, rail lines and highway systems. To
control for such possibilities, we include a measure of trade openness
(OPENjt), given as the sum of imports and exports divided by GDP (Head
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and Ries 1998). We also include the population of each home country
(POPjt) to serve as a proxy for market size. All monetary values, trade ﬂows
and otherwise, wherever necessary have been normalized to constant 1995
US dollars.
We include several dummy variables in our estimation equation. As
common language has been identiﬁed as a determinant of trade ﬂows in
gravity speciﬁcations (Dunlevy 2006; Hutchinson 2002; Girma and Yu
2002), we include a dummy variable that is equal to one if English is
commonly used in the host country (ENGj) (United States CIA 2006).
Capturing the eﬀects of trade agreements, FTAjt is equal to one if the home
country is party to a trade agreement with the US for more than six months
during year t. To capture related geographic eﬀects on trade, we include a
dummy variable (PORTj) that is equal to one if the home country is not
landlocked. Finally, we append a vector of time dummy variables, Ot, to our
estimation equation to ensure that contemporaneous growth in immigrant
population stocks and trade values does not distort our results. A complete
listing of variables and associated descriptive statistics is provided as
Table 1.
5.

Discussion of estimation results

We estimate three variants of Equation (3). First, we estimate our empirical
model by utilizing the standard immigrant stock variable (i.e. not
diﬀerentiating refugees from non-refugee immigrants). Then we consider
variation in the immigrant–trade relationship across refugees and nonrefugee immigrants. Finally, we decompose the cultural distance variable
into its component dimensions, interact each component, separately, with
the refugee and non-refugee immigrant stock variables, and estimate our
model. To garner the economic signiﬁcance of our results, we follow
Millimet and Osang (2007) and provide estimates of geodesic distance oﬀset
per immigrant, an indication of the extent to which the pro-trade eﬀects
immigrants may counter the cost of transportation.
5.1. Immigrants, cultural distance and US–home country trade
Results presented in Table 2 conﬁrm the ﬁndings of prior studies. With the
single exception of when imports of non-manufactured goods are employed
as the dependent variable (column (e)), immigrants are found to exert
positive inﬂuences on US imports from and exports to their respective home
countries. The coeﬃcients on the immigrant stock variables range in
magnitude from 0.1309 to 0.3188. Regardless of the speciﬁcation used, we
also see that geodesic distance (a proxy for transport costs) acts to reduce
trade ﬂows. As expected, the coeﬃcient on the cultural distance variable is
negative in all estimations and is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero when

Exports
Non-Manufactured Exports
Manufactured Exports
Imports
Non-Manufactured Imports
Manufactured Imports
Immigrants
Refugees/Asylees
Non-Refugee Immigrants
Cultural Distance
Survival vs. Self-expression Values
Traditional vs. Secular-rational Authority
Geodesic Distance (in kilometers)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
GDP Deﬂator
Population
D ln Exchange Rate
Economic Remoteness
Trade Openness
English
Free Trade Agreement
Seaport

Tijt
‘‘
‘‘
‘‘
‘‘
‘‘
IMijt
REF_IMijt
NREF_IMijt
CDijt
SSEjt
TSRjt
GDij
GDPjt
Ydefjt
POPjt
D lnXRATEijt
REMjt
OPENjt
ENGj
FTAijt
PORTj

9,253,632.83
1,201,932.99
8,050,578.93
13,554,553.75
1,998,869.43
11,552,345.40
382,998
25,757
357,241
1.2594
0.0772
70.1908
8,271.49
296,461,463.27
2,703.49
77,014,900
0.1093
19,661.90
0.7113
0.4407
0.0508
0.8644

Mean
(22,246,859.51)
(2,849,937.35)
(19,774,826.93)
(31,297,864.13)
(5,703,052.45)
(27,211,705.49)
(1,101,439)
(83,910)
(1,096,015
(0.4949)
(0.649)
(0.7788)
(3,406.21)
(627,384,282.03)
(14,984.84)
(202,159,489)
(0.2065)
(30,995.84)
(0.4123)
(0.4972)
(0.22)
(0.3428)

Std. Dev.

Note: Trade and GDP values are in thousands of US dollars. All monetary values have been converted to 1995 US dollars.

Description

Descriptive statistics.

Variable

Table 1.
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354
354
354
354
354
354
354
354
354
59
59
59
59
354
354
354
354
354
354
59
354
59
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Englishj

ln Economic Remotenessjt

ln (GDP Deﬂatorjt/
GDP Deﬂatorit)
ln Trade Opennessjt

D ln Exchange Rateijt

ln Populationjt

ln GDPjt

ln Geodesic Distanceij

ln Immigrantsijt 6 ln
Cultural Distanceijt
ln Cultural Distanceijt

ln Immigrantsijt

0.2731***
(0.0425)
0.2118***
(0.0673)
72.3759***
(0.8143)
70.699***
(0.1049)
1.1365***
(0.0858)
70.1425***
(0.0482)
70.2034***
(0.0614)
0.1064***
(0.0232)
0.3988***
(0.0909)
0.1487**
(0.0694)
0.6315***
(0.0959)

(a)

ln Exportsijt

0.1875***
(0.0439)
0.1438*
(0.0788)
71.2189
(0.9802)
70.6894***
(0.0893)
0.8414***
(0.1078)
0.1718***
(0.0602)
70.1746**
(0.071)
70.0059
(0.0282)
0.5915***
(0.12)
0.1383*
(0.0838)
0.3386***
(0.1001)

(b)

ln Non-Manu.
Exportsijt

Immigrants, cultural distance and trade.

Explanatory variables

Table 2.

0.2988***
(0.0416)
0.2911***
(0.0648)
73.4847***
(0.7895)
70.7476***
(0.1052)
1.2077***
(0.0816)
70.191***
(0.0454)
70.2047***
(0.0586)
0.1305***
(0.0228)
0.3908***
(0.0858)
0.148**
(0.0664)
0.6661***
(0.0926)

(c)

ln Manu.
Exportsijt

0.1309**
(0.053)
0.3951***
(0.0846)
74.512***
(1.0446)
70.6746***
(0.1201)
1.2735***
(0.0969)
0.1116*
(0.0633)
70.1499***
(0.0563)
0.0605
(0.04)
0.6432***
(0.1056)
0.3378***
(0.0772)
0.3047***
(0.1108)

(d)

ln Importsijt

Dependent variables
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70.0306
(0.0637)
0.00001
(0.0941)
70.9235
(1.1486)
71.0432***
(0.15)
0.8717***
(0.1313)
0.3904***
(0.08)
70.0931
(0.0814)
70.0049
(0.0496)
0.2293*
(0.1286)
0.4635***
(0.1006)
0.176
(0.1342)

(e)

ln Non-Manu.
Importsijt

(continued)

0.3188***
(0.0579)
0.2377***
(0.0857)
72.3713**
(1.0319)
70.3471***
(0.1052)
1.3785***
(0.0994)
70.1048
(0.0663)
70.0453
(0.0647)
0.0438
(0.0343)
0.6029***
(0.1187)
0.2095**
(0.0821)
0.4639***
(0.1111)

(f)

ln Manu.
Importsijt
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(Continued ).

0.7858***
(0.1929)
0.2492*
(0.1479)
1.2E-08
(8.6E-09)
710.3317***
(2.67)
354
0.7151
2,521***
40.75

(a)

ln Exportsijt

0.9212***
(0.1754)
1.6785***
(0.1453)
1.3E-08
(1.2E-08)
79.9396***
(2.9904)
354
0.7048
1,903***
746.26

(b)

ln Non-Manu.
Exportsijt

0.7508***
(0.191)
0.1021
(0.1294)
9.8E-09
(8E-09)
711.3396***
(2.5509)
354
0.7376
4,009***
23.22

(c)

ln Manu.
Exportsijt

1.2403***
(0.2713)
70.0109
(0.2359)
1.3E-08
(8.3E-09)
717.5934***
(2.9743)
354
0.7066
1,435***
94.82

(d)

ln Importsijt

Dependent variables

70.1041
(0.2809)
1.2936***
(0.2477)
79.9E-09
(1.2E-08)
711.056***
(3.9495)
354
0.6216
626***
710.96

(e)

ln Non-Manu.
Importsijt

1.5315***
(0.2489)
70.4868**
(0.24)
1.4E-08*
(8.3E-09)
720.871***
(3.0976)
354
0.7004
1,939***
46.16

(f)

ln Manu.
Importsijt

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Coeﬃcients on time dummy
variables not reported.

N
Pseudo R2
Wald chi2
Log likelihood

Lagged (one-year) change
in Dep. Var.
Constant

Seaportj

FTAijt

Explanatory variables

Table 2.
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aggregate and manufacturing exports and imports are employed as
dependent variables. The coeﬃcient on the term which interacts the
immigrant stock variable and the cultural distance variable is positive and
signiﬁcant in all estimations except when imports of non-manufactured
goods are considered. The pattern of signiﬁcance and the signs/magnitudes
of the coeﬃcient estimates suggest that immigrants oﬀset, at least in part,
the eﬀects of cultural distance.
Turning to the estimated coeﬃcients on the remaining explanatory
variables in Table 2, we observe that most coeﬃcients bear the expected
signs. Higher GDP values for immigrants’ home countries correlate with
increased US trade. Elasticity values are near or below unity, which is
consistent with ﬁndings from prior gravity-based studies. A proxy for
market size, higher home country population is expected to be positively
related to trade ﬂows; however, while the US tends to trade more intensively
in non-manufactured products, it trades less-intensively in manufactured
products with relatively larger population home countries. Depreciation of
immigrants’ home country currencies vis-à-vis the US dollar correspond,
respectively, to decreases in home countries’ imports from the US, the eﬀect
being less magniﬁed on US imports. The ratio of home country-to-US GDP
deﬂators is included to control for relative prices between the US and each
home country. The positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on this variable when
aggregate exports and exports of manufactured products are used as
dependent variables suggest that home countries that receive relatively
higher prices for their exports, an indication of increased competitiveness,
tend to import more from the US. Similarly, the positive and signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients on the index of trade openness indicate that the US trades more
with home countries that are relatively more open to trade. Home countries
facing relatively fewer non-US trading opportunities tend to trade more
intensively with the US. We also observe more trade between the US and
home countries that commonly use English, indicating the importance of a
shared language for facilitating transactions. Finally, the US trades more
with home countries if they are parties to trade agreements with them and
with home countries that are not landlocked.
5.2.

Refugee and non-refugee immigrants, cultural distance and US trade

In Table 3, we provide results from a modiﬁed version of Equation (3),
where we distill the immigrant stock variable into refugee and non-refugee
immigrants, again interacting each with the cultural distance variable. In
Table 4, we present results from similar speciﬁcation where we use both
refugee and non-refugee immigrants separately while also decomposing the
cultural distance variable into its component dimensions, SSE and TSR.
Beginning with the results presented in Table 3, we ﬁnd considerable
variation in the coeﬃcient estimates of the variables denoting immigrant

70.0015
(0.0171)
0.0416
(0.0294)
0.2396***
(0.0445)
0.0862
(0.0668)
71.105
(0.7649)
70.6845***
(0.1156)
1.156***
(0.0864)
70.1415***
(0.0474)
70.2082***
(0.0633)
0.0909***
(0.0227)
0.3923***
(0.0916)

ln Refugees/Asyleesijt

ln Trade Opennessjt

ln (GDP Deﬂatorjt/GDP Deﬂatorit)

D ln Exchange Rateijt

ln Populationjt

ln GDPjt

ln Geodesic Distanceij

ln Non-Refugee Immigrantsijt 6
ln Cultural Distanceijt
ln Cultural Distanceijt

ln Refugees/Asyleesijt 6
ln Cultural Distanceijt
ln Non-Refugee Immigrantsijt

(a)

ln Exportsijt
(c)
70.013
(0.0169)
0.0329
(0.0275)
0.2851***
(0.0422)
0.1237**
(0.0599)
71.6012**
(0.6888)
70.6999***
(0.1124)
1.2545***
(0.0809)
70.2083***
(0.0409)
70.2249***
(0.0671)
0.1284***
(0.023)
0.4171***
(0.0826)

0.0618***
(0.0168)
0.0059
(0.03)
0.1395***
(0.042)
0.0618
(0.0683)
70.1937
(0.8047)
70.7785***
(0.0902)
0.8803***
(0.1018)
0.1206**
(0.0528)
70.2***
(0.0746)
0.001
(0.0256)
0.5101***
(0.1177)

ln Manu.
Exportsijt

70.0508**
(0.0205)
0.0676*
(0.0378)
0.1836***
(0.0576)
0.2139**
(0.0918)
72.6595***
(1.0311)
70.5361***
(0.1322)
1.2654***
(0.0943)
0.1039*
(0.0623)
70.1422**
(0.0562)
0.044
(0.0392)
0.7247***
(0.1058)

(d)

ln Importsijt

Dependent variables

(b)

ln Non-Manu.
Exportsijt

Refugees/asylees, other immigrants, cultural distance and trade.

Explanatory variables

Table 3.
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0.03
(0.0213)
0.0174
(0.034)
70.0931
(0.0605)
70.0188
(0.0886)
70.7722
(0.9575)
71.1399***
(0.1486)
0.9853***
(0.1123)
0.3576***
(0.0692)
70.11
(0.0909)
0.0284
(0.048)
0.247**
(0.1136)

(e)

ln Non-Manu.
Importsijt

(continued)

70.0763***
(0.0178)
0.1191***
(0.0337)
0.406***
(0.0555)
70.0941
(0.0851)
0.9252
(0.9619)
70.087
(0.0997)
1.4669***
(0.0936)
70.1684***
(0.0617)
70.0285
(0.065)
0.02
(0.0332)
0.7664***
(0.1173)

(f)

ln Manu.
Importsijt
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(Continued ).

0.1586**
(0.0711)
0.5694***
(0.1075)
0.7678***
(0.207)
0.2467
(0.1601)
1.4E-08
(8.8E-09)
710.6208***
(2.7055)
354
0.7064
2,615***
25.28

(a)

ln Exportsijt

0.1728**
(0.0813)
0.5135***
(0.1094)
0.9466***
(0.1637)
1.7574***
(0.1557)
0.032*
(0.0185)
79.5996***
(2.8529)
354
0.7123
2,613***
772.14

(b)

ln Non-Manu.
Exportsijt

0.1702**
(0.0707)
0.5868***
(0.1001)
0.6548***
(0.1975)
0.1044
(0.136)
0.0137
(0.0117)
712.5644***
(2.6246)
354
0.7306
5,206***
718.73

(c)

ln Manu.
Exportsijt

0.3078***
(0.0755)
0.1457
(0.1207)
0.917***
(0.2952)
70.0597
(0.2402)
3.1E-05
(8.2E-09)
718.3491***
(2.9292)
354
0.6913
1,542***
81.28

(d)

ln Importsijt

Dependent variables

0.5107***
(0.0881)
0.3386**
(0.1353)
70.2278
(0.213)
1.4723***
(0.2076)
70.0047
(0.0126)
712.6745***
(3.4622)
354
0.6294
980***
778.91

(e)

ln Non-Manu.
Importsijt

0.2038***
(0.0776)
0.1767*
(0.1034)
1.1064***
(0.3051)
70.5255**
(0.2328)
0.0137
(0.0087)
724.5878***
(2.9236)
354
0.7087
2,570***
710.33

(f)

ln Manu.
Importsijt

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Coeﬃcients on time dummy
variables not reported.

N
Pseudo R2
Wald chi2
Log likelihood

Lagged (one-year) change
in Dep. Var.
Constant

Seaportj

FTAijt

Englishj

ln Economic Remotenessjt

Explanatory variables

Table 3.
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types. Accordingly, mirroring the pattern of signiﬁcance and consistency of
the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients reported in Table 2, coeﬃcients on the
non-refugee immigrant stock variable indicate that non-refugee immigrants
have signiﬁcant pro-trade inﬂuences on US trade with their home countries.
Given the results reported in Table 2, as the large majority of immigrants to
the US did not enter the country as refugees, this result is not surprising.
Again, while negative across all estimations, the coeﬃcients on the
cultural distance variables are signiﬁcant in the regressions where aggregate
imports and exports of manufactured products are used as dependent
variables. Suggesting that non-refugee immigrants counter the tradeinhibiting inﬂuence of cultural distance, the coeﬃcients on the variable
that interacts the non-refugee immigrant stock with the cultural distance
variable is both positive and signiﬁcant in both estimations where the
coeﬃcients on the cultural distance variable are negative and signiﬁcant.
Refugee immigrants, however, counter the inhibiting inﬂuence of cultural
distance on imports of aggregate and manufactured products. Yet, in
contrast to the proportional inﬂuences of non-refugee immigrants, the
associated estimated eﬀects of refugees are not strong enough to yield
signiﬁcant eﬀects. Thus, while refugees do exert relatively weak, yet positive,
inﬂuences on trade, non-refugee immigrants exert much stronger inﬂuences.
This is consistent with the notion of refugees, compared with non-refugee
immigrants, being less connected to or less able to exploit, build and/or
maintain connections with partners or networks in their home countries.
Results presented in Table 4 also support the ﬁndings reported thus far,
with the coeﬃcients on the variables representing refugees and non-refugee
immigrants following the patterns depicted in Table 3. As the results in the
table were estimated with the cultural distance variable decomposed into its
component dimensions, the results more clearly depict the inﬂuence of
cultural distance on trade. We see that, across speciﬁcations, the tradeinhibiting eﬀects of the cultural diﬀerences between the US and immigrant
home countries, measured along the TSR dimension are consistently
negative and signiﬁcant. To the contrary, the coeﬃcient on the cultural
distance between the US and immigrant home countries measured along the
SSE dimension is negative, yet insigniﬁcant, in all estimations except when
imports of manufactured products are employed as the dependent variable;
in which case, the coeﬃcient is both positive and signiﬁcant. This pattern is
largely consistent with the ﬁndings reported in White and Tadesse (2008),
who also report similar estimates without diﬀerentiating immigrants by their
entry classiﬁcations.
Coeﬃcients on the terms that interact the TSR and refugee immigrant
stock variables are typically positive and signiﬁcant, indicating a pro-trade
(export and import) inﬂuence of refugee immigrants that acts to oﬀset the
inﬂuences of the TSR dimension of cultural diﬀerences between the US and
immigrants’ home countries. A similar pattern is found, albeit with

0.0114
(0.0205)
70.0218
(0.0142)
0.0349**
(0.0142)
0.3406***
(0.0421)
70.0133
(0.0415)
0.1964***
(0.0542)
0.1885
(0.4261)
72.5277***
(0.661)
70.4857***
(0.1148)
0.9077***
(0.0818)
70.1058*
(0.0549)

ln Refugees/Asyleesijt

ln Populationjt

ln GDPjt

ln Geodesic Distanceij

ln TSR Distanceijt

ln Non-Refugee Immigrantsijt 6
ln SSE Distanceijt
ln Non-Refugee Immigrantsijt 6
ln TSR Distanceijt
ln SSE Distanceijt

ln Refugees/Asyleesijt 6
ln SSE Distanceijt
ln Refugees/Asyleesijt 6
ln TSR Distanceijt
ln Non-Refugee Immigrantsijt

(a)

ln Exportsijt

0.0467**
(0.0218)
0.0081
(0.0167)
0.0294**
(0.0175)
0.228***
(0.0468)
70.0116
(0.046)
0.2142***
(0.0628)
0.1747
(0.4843)
72.7637***
(0.7625)
70.6709***
(0.0993)
0.6423***
(0.096)
0.2123***
(0.0609)

(b)

ln Non-Manu.
Exportsijt

0.0149
(0.0187)
70.0266**
(0.0125)
0.0464***
(0.0134)
0.406***
(0.0343)
0.0024
(0.0341)
0.1483***
(0.0485)
0.0092
(0.3436)
72.0169***
(0.5893)
70.4416***
(0.1065)
0.9621***
(0.077)
70.2149***
(0.0443)

(c)

ln Manu.
Exportsijt

70.0179
(0.0237)
0.0358**
(0.0183)
0.0321**
(0.0158)
0.3764***
(0.0496)
70.0065
(0.0512)
0.2425***
(0.0612)
70.2549
(0.5199)
73.0523***
(0.7342)
70.3265**
(0.1349)
0.955***
(0.0856)
0.162**
(0.067)

(d)

ln Importsijt

Dependent variables

Refugees/asylees, other immigrants, dimensions of cultural distance and trade.

Explanatory variables

Table 4.
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0.029
(0.0207)
0.028**
(0.0134)
70.0423***
(0.0163)
70.015
(0.0617)
70.0689
(0.0432)
0.0451
(0.0694)
70.2589
(0.433)
70.1871
(0.8036)
71.0867***
(0.1262)
0.7652***
(0.1091)
0.6719***
(0.0726)

(e)

ln Non-Manu.
Importsijt

(continued)

70.0214
(0.0196)
0.0392***
(0.0139)
0.0844***
(0.0149)
0.468***
(0.0439)
70.1079***
(0.04)
0.1824***
(0.0627)
1.2293***
(0.4158)
72.7615***
(0.7254)
70.0139
(0.0872)
1.1974***
(0.0765)
70.2625***
(0.0652)

(f)

ln Manu.
Importsijt
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70.07**
(0.0311)
70.197***
(0.0666)
0.6011***
(0.1237)
0.0113
(0.0802)
0.2205*
(0.1195)
0.8143***
(0.1495)
1.9641***
(0.2012)
0.0221
(0.0169)
75.5371**
(2.6657)
354
0.7123
1,791***
729.51

(b)

ln Non-Manu.
Exportsijt

0.1034***
(0.0219)
70.2007***
(0.0727)
0.4481***
(0.0807)
70.0375
(0.0678)
0.5024***
(0.0949)
0.7306***
(0.16)
0.4612***
(0.133)
0.0091
(0.0111)
77.3694***
(2.4665)
354
0.7471
4,426***
75.53

(c)

ln Manu.
Exportsijt

0.0072
(0.0389)
70.0768
(0.0527)
0.7113***
(0.0997)
0.0986
(0.0696)
0.0442
(0.1205)
0.7749***
(0.2608)
0.0485
(0.2422)
2.9E-09
(8.2E-09)
714.0538***
(2.688)
354
0.7087
1,603***
104.72

(d)

ln Importsijt

Dependent variables

0.1093**
(0.0427)
70.1182
(0.0884)
0.3335***
(0.1237)
0.4555***
(0.0805)
0.2426**
(0.1233)
0.2771
(0.2549)
1.5384***
(0.1611)
-0.0041
(0.0125)
713.7698***
(3.1314)
354
0.6760
1,224***
767.18

(e)

ln Non-Manu.
Importsijt

70.0432
(0.0409)
0.067
(0.0622)
0.6827***
(0.1042)
70.0591
(0.062)
0.0411
(0.0938)
0.9005***
(0.1781)
70.3165
(0.2368)
0.0104
(0.0093)
715.5807***
(2.432)
354
0.7172
3,852***
712.17

(f)

ln Manu.
Importsijt

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Coeﬃcients on time dummy
variables not reported.

N
Pseudo R2
Wald chi2
Log likelihood

Lagged (one-year) change
in Dep. Var.
Constant

Seaportj

FTAijt

Englishj

ln Economic Remotenessjt

ln Trade Opennessjt

0.0581**
(0.0251)
70.169***
(0.0627)
0.485***
(0.0937)
70.0171
(0.0685)
0.4393***
(0.1095)
0.767***
(0.1733)
0.5748***
(0.1581)
1.3E-08
(9.3E-09)
76.5687**
(2.572)
354
0.7232
2,102***
53.28

ln (GDP Deﬂatorjt/GDP
Deﬂatorit)
D ln Exchange Rateijt

ln Exportsijt
(a)

(Continued ).

Explanatory variables

Table 4.
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coeﬃcients on greater magnitude, when evaluating the role of non-refugee
immigrants in oﬀsetting the inﬂuences of cultural diﬀerences measured along
the TSR dimension. Additionally, the coeﬃcient estimate of the interaction
term between refugee immigrant stock variable and the SSE dimension of
cultural distance suggests that refugee immigrants oﬀset related cultural
diﬀerences on aggregate US imports and that of manufactured goods.
However, the coeﬃcient is negative and signiﬁcant for aggregate US exports
in general and those of manufacturing goods. This implies that given their
relationship with their home countries, while refugees may act to overcome
the negative eﬀect of cultural diﬀerences measured along the SSE dimension
in promoting US imports, their abilities to oﬀset, fully or partially, a similar
eﬀect of cultural diﬀerences between the US and their home countries is
constrained to an extent that the trade-inhibiting eﬀect of the SSE
dimension of cultural diﬀerence overrides their potential contribution.
5.3. Estimated per-immigrant trade eﬀects and geodesic distance oﬀsets
Our results so far indicate that, albeit there are diﬀerences in the extent to
which refugee and non-refugee immigrants aﬀect their home–host country
trade ﬂows across diﬀerent products, immigrants have pro-trade eﬀects that
also partially oﬀset the trade-inhibiting eﬀect of cultural distances, whether
measured along combined or separate dimensions, while geodesic distance
signiﬁcantly reduces the amount of trade taking place. In order to garner a
better understanding of the economic signiﬁcance of the observed
proportional pro-trade eﬀect of each class of immigrants reported, in this
section, we follow Millimet and Osang (2007) and estimate the extent to
which immigrants may oﬀset the amount of trade that would be lost due to
the geodesic distance (and thus, transportation costs) between the US and
immigrant home countries.8
Table 5 presents the estimated distance oﬀset based on signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients reported in Tables 2 through 4. When using coeﬃcients on
immigrant stock variables where we do not diﬀerentiate between refugee
and non-refugee immigrants, we derive the per-immigrant distance oﬀset,
measured in kilometers, as GD  exp fðl1 =g1 Þ  ln½IM=ðIM þ 1Þ þ
ðl2 =g1 Þ  ln CD  ln½IM=ðIM þ 1Þ  1g.9 When we decompose the immigrant stock variable into refugee and non-refugee immigrants, we modify
the derivation of the distance oﬀset accordingly. Dividing the average
geodesic distance between the US and a typical immigrant’s home country in
our data, 8271 km, by the estimated distance oﬀset per immigrant produces a
further estimate of the number of immigrants necessary to completely
counteract the negative eﬀect of geodesic distance (transport costs) on trade
between the US and the typical immigrant’s home country. While our
estimation method assumes constant returns to immigration, we understand
that the pro-trade eﬀect of immigrants may not be proportional to the size of

220.75
(37,468)
636.89
(12,987)
123.64
(66,895)
2.64
(3,133,845)
0.32
(25,800,236)

(25,905)
–
–
2.21

(3,750,387)

(b)

451.55
(18,317)
–
–
319.28

(a)

Non-Manu.
Exports

(1,048,602)

(17,080)
1.86
(4,455,402)
7.89

498.25
(16,600)
–
–
484.25

(c)

Manu.
Exports

(417,275)

(21,639)
1.87
(4,433,425)
19.82

176.40
(46,887)
312.37
(26,478)
382.22

(d)

Imports

Trade Measure

–

–
2.06
(4,009,797)
–

–
–
–
–
–

(e)

Non-Manu.
Imports

d

d

–
–

d

d

d

d

10,644.80
(777)

(f)

Manu.
Imports

Note: Values in parentheses are the numbers of immigrants needed to completely oﬀset average distance of 8,271 kilometers. See text for explanation of
oﬀset values. a,b,cValues calculated using coeﬃcients presented in Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4, respectively. dWhile the proportional immigrant eﬀect is
positive and signiﬁcant, the estimated geodesic distance coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant from zero.

Non-Refugee
Immigrantsc

Refugees/Asyleesc

Non-Refugee
Immigrantsb

Refugees/Asyleesb

Immigrants

a

Exports

Per-immigrant oﬀsets of geodesic distance (in meters).

Immigrant Type

Table 5.
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the immigrant population. Thus, although our estimates might be exaggerated, the estimates do provide an indication of the relative strength of
immigrant–trade links across the diﬀerent trade measures and immigrant
types.
Focusing ﬁrst on the eﬀect of immigrants, generally speaking, in
oﬀsetting the negative eﬀect of geodesic distance on trade, the estimates
indicate that the extent to which a typical immigrant counters the negative
eﬀect of geodesic distance on US exports to – and imports from – her home
country varies by 452 meters and 176 meters, respectively. Given that these
values are estimates of the amount of geographic distance that a typical
immigrant oﬀsets for transporting the average US exports or imports in a
given year to the immigrant’s home country, it is straightforward to infer the
substantial economic signiﬁcance of the pro-trade eﬀect of immigrants.
Using these estimates as a benchmark, we ﬁnd that fully oﬀsetting the eﬀect
of transport costs on US exports to a typical home country requires an
additional 18,317 immigrants from that home country, while a greater
number of immigrants, 46,887, is required to completely oﬀset the transport
costs associated with US imports.
The asymmetry in the distances oﬀset indicates that the extent to which
immigrants are capable of oﬀsetting the cost of transportation on US exports
to their home countries tends to outweigh the extent to which they can
inﬂuence the cost of transportation on US imports from their home countries.
If the pro-import eﬀect of immigrants is largely due to their ‘transplanted
home bias’ preferences and the pro-export inﬂuence is driven by their ‘cultural’
and ‘enforcement’ bridge eﬀects, the observed ability of immigrants to oﬀset a
greater geodesic distance for exports than imports would not be surprising.
Similarly, comparing the eﬀects across product categories, we ﬁnd that the
extent to which immigrants can oﬀset the costs of transportation on US trade
with their home countries is generally greater for manufactured products than
for non-manufactured products, plausibly because of diﬀerences in the
bulkiness of products in the latter category or complexities associated with
standardization of diﬀerent goods and thus diﬀerences in the ability of
immigrants to oﬀset the associated cost of transportation across diﬀerent
products. Lastly, distilling the immigrant stock variable into refugee and nonrefugee stocks, along with decomposition of the cultural distance variable into
its component dimensions, reveals that while non-refugee immigrants typically
oﬀset a signiﬁcant and large amount of the cost of transportation on US trade
with their home countries, refugee immigrants are estimated to exert weaker
eﬀects in terms of oﬀsetting distance.
6. Concluding comments
Prior studies of the immigrant–trade relationship provide a general
understanding of the role that immigrants play in enhancing trade between
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their host and home countries. Although, historically, the US has accepted
relatively diverse and large numbers of refugee and non-refugee immigrants
alike, whether or not the eﬀect of immigrants on US–home country trade
varies across immigrants’ entry classiﬁcations has not been examined.
Employing data that span the years 1996–2001 for the US and 59 home
countries, we provide the ﬁrst examination of variation in the US
immigrant–trade link across immigrant entry classiﬁcations. Our results
indicate that immigrants generally exert positive inﬂuences on US trade with
their home countries; however, the inﬂuence of refugees, while positive, is of
considerably lesser magnitude as compared with that of non-refugee
immigrants. Furthermore, for both immigrant types, our results indicate
that immigrants oﬀset the trade-inhibiting eﬀects of cultural distance, a
measure of cultural and institutional dissimilarity between the US and
immigrants’ home countries, with the related eﬀects of non-refugee
immigrants being stronger than those of refugee immigrants.
The relatively weak inﬂuences of refugee immigrants on US trade with
their home countries may be the result of such immigrants having more
tenuous ties to their home countries relative to the ties of non-refugee
immigrants. Moreover, constraints on refugees’ abilities to maintain/foster
connections with home country-based trading partners would correspond to
a diminished likelihood of refugees increasing US exports via either the
cultural or enforcement bridges. Similarly, as refugee immigrants have
limited connections to their home country business and/or social networks,
they are also less inﬂuential in promoting their host countries exports to
their home countries. Finally, that the pro-import inﬂuence of refugee
immigrants is of low magnitude may be the result of a transplanted home
bias eﬀect that is not found in conjunction with an information bridge or
network eﬀect. While the ﬁndings presented here clearly suggest the
existence of diﬀerences in the extent to which refugee and non-refugee
immigrants aﬀect US–home country trade, they also suggest the need for
additional research, using more disaggregated trade measures while
considering more detailed immigrant characteristics that we cannot account
for. Although we have treated all immigrants as being equally capable of
inﬂuencing trade ﬂows, some immigrants may be better-equipped, in terms
of education and their human capital levels or access to host country
networks resulting from occupational choice, etc., to exert pro-trade eﬀects
than are other immigrants. Likewise, as immigrants’ assimilation may aﬀect
their abilities to inﬂuence host–home country trade ﬂows, it is reasonable to
expect that the ability of immigrants to inﬂuence host–home country trade
varies based on the length of time that immigrants (refugees and nonrefugees, alike) have resided in the US. Given the data we employ, we are
unable to control for the durations of immigrants’ stays in the US. Thus,
further exploration of the immigrant–trade relationship that aﬀords a
greater emphasis on these and other immigrant characteristics is merited.
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Notes
1.
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3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Other important pieces of legislation that inﬂuenced the level and composition of
both total immigrant inﬂows and refugee/asylee inﬂows during this period
include the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, the Migration and Refugee Assistance
Act of 1962 and the Refugee Act of 1980.
Tinbergen (1962) ﬁrst applies the gravity speciﬁcation to trade, and more recent
research has established theoretical foundations for the model. See, for example,
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra (2004).
Detailed information regarding the WVS/EVS, including a description of the
data collection methodology and additional country-speciﬁc examples can be
found at www.worldvaluessurvey.org. While the WVS/EVS provides data for 81
countries, incomplete data restricts our sample to only 59 nations. A listing of
the nations in our data set is provided in the appendix.
On average, the Values Surveys provide TSR and SSE values for 1190 residents
of each nation in our sample. For the US, 1117 residents were surveyed. Mean
values are un-weighted arithmetic averages.
Estimated cultural distances depicted in Figure 1 and all other data used in this
study are available upon request.
Unless noted, data for explanatory variables arepfrom
the World
Bank (2006).
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ﬃ
Internal distance, when k ¼ j, is derived as 0:4  Land Massj (Head and Mayer,
2000).
Using the Iceberg trade model, these estimates indicate the reduction in the cost
of transporting goods to and from the immigrants’ home countries that is
attributable to the presence of each type of immigrant in the US.
Since geodesic distance is measured in kilometers, multiplying the resulting oﬀset
estimates by 1000 converts the estimates into meters of geodesic distance oﬀset
by a typical immigrant.
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Appendix. Country listing, with estimated refugee/asylee and other immigrant stocks.

Country

Avg.
Refugee/
Asylee
stock

Avg. NonRefugee
Immigrant
stock

Albania
Algeria
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh
Belgium
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Denmark
Dominican Rep.
Egypt
El Salvador
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan

12,181
51
107
24
25,672
0
110
32
8,989
157
1,146
42,123
720
0
105
7,119
3,430
9,269
11
657
147,505
19,908
54,715
0
8
18,371
18
82
66,404
9,965

17,640
10,770
122,675
58,696
37,341
77,359
33,888
165,119
17,210
794,709
77,119
983,489
466,332
31,623
669,441
98,588
789,894
226
21,438
145,598
560,980
147,970
38,024
5,356
880,765
51,315
161,331
109,353
410,140
330,723

Country

Avg.
Refugee/
Asylee
stock

Avg. NonRefugee
Immigrant
stock

Jordan
Korea, Rep.
Latvia
Luxembourg
Mexico
Morocco
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russian Fed.
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Tanzania
Turkey
Uganda
UK
Uruguay
Venezuela
Vietnam
Zimbabwe

26
4,624
24,619
0
451
20
21,445
6
859
15
30
500
211
164,170
3,977
55,330
211,979
830
8,565
4
9
0
5,867
1,336
381
53
837
584,511
134

46,808
812,085
2,105
2,114
8,360,978
29,645
73,567
21,830
121,291
31,940
197,572
264,958
1,333,326
311,420
198,433
87,055
165,594
57,272
74,267
49,785
44,340
10,085
69,221
9,877
659,036
25,164
83,411
611,557
7,358

